The works available here are the responsibility of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of other SPRU researchers. As matters of policy and practice, SPRU does not endorse individual research contributions.
Introduction
International trade scholars are increasingly aware that the unit of analysis of traditional trade theory is changing, from final products to tasks (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2006; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2012; Costinot, Vogel, and Wang 2013; Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2014) . Both the volume and geographical spread of traded tasks are also increasing. International fragmentation of production, which implies that countries specialise in portions of the value chain and trade other portions of it, is a relatively recent phenomenon, involving offshoring and globalisation of value chains (for recent reviews, see (R Kaplinsky 2013; OECD 2013; Timmer et al. 2013) . As put by Baldwin (Baldwin 2011) , this process has led to a 'second unbundling' of globalisation, transformed the terms of international competition and shifted the barycentre of the world's global headquarters and peripheries (see also Baldwin & López-Gonzalez 2014) .
As often occurs in the discipline, academic interest in a new phenomenon sparks fierce debates on its determinants and effects. Analysis of the emergence of GVCs within the landscape of international trade theory is no exception. Scholars have looked at the conditions that favours countries joining GVCs (Costinot, Vogel, and Wang 2013) ; at their effects on labour markets and wages in participating countries (Feenstra and Hanson 1999; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2006; Antras, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg 2006; Timmer et al. 2013; Acemoglu, Gancia, and Zilibotti 2014) ; at the implications in terms of GVC governance asymmetries between developed and developing countries (R Kaplinsky 2000; R Kaplinsky 2013; Schmitz and Strambach 2009 ). This literature often shows opposite stands when it comes to -for instance -the presence and the quality of the contribution of GVCs to processes of catching up and development.
Within these debates, scholarship has so far overlooked the increasing importance of fragmentation of production that involves services offshoring. Services have generally been considered as nontradable and often overlooked in traditional trade statistics (R. W. Jones and Kierzkowski 1990) .
The new developments of trade theory based on the trade-in-task framework have not yet been able to incorporate services offshoring. The trade-in-task framework's core assumption is related to falling transport and communication costs, which are claimed to have caused two different 'unbundling' of globalisation (Baldwin 2011; Baldwin and López-Gonzalez 2014) . We acknowledge that the adoption of the task approach originally put forward by (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003) and adopted in (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2014) might in principle well serve the 3 purpose of a generalised framework that encompasses international fragmentation of production of intangible activities such as services, although we do not attempt to develop this argument here.
From a rather different perspective, the empirical evidence on service GVCs is so far mainly based on industry cases (Gereffi & Fernandez-stark 2010a; Gereffi & Fernandez-stark 2010b ; see also Massini & Miozzo 2012) . The increasing service offshoring and the first-time participation of developing countries might be considered as a 'third unbundling' of globalisation, paraphrasing (Baldwin 2011) . Indeed, developing countries, and especially Latin America after East Asia, is increasingly becoming a destination for service offshore. Participation in GVC in business services is therefore increasingly being considered as opening up new opportunities for catching up in developing countries (Blinder 2006; Gary Gereffi and Fernandez-stark 2010a; Lema, Quadros, and Schmitz 2012 ; Ventura-Dias 2012; Hernández, R., N. Mulder, K. Fernandez-Stark, P. Sauvé, D.
López Giral 2014).
This paper aims to reappraise the debate on GVCs in services from two perspectives.
First, we briefly review the literature on GVCs in general and in particular on service offshoring both within theories of international trade and the applied firm-level contributions. We then revert to two alternative voices often neglected in these circles, those of Hirschman (Hirschman 1958) and Linder (Burenstam Linder 1961) . In particular, we consider the theoretical stands by Hirschman and (a modified version of) the Linder Thesis, and consider them jointly to explain the propensity to participate in services offshoring and GVCs, as a competitive explanation with respect to the traditional determinants of cost and factor endowments. We broadly derive our conjecture on the basis of the empirical evidence shown in our prior work López-Gonzalez, Meliciani, and Savona 2014) , and take stock of the literature on the economics of services. We then claim that the higher the domestic specialisation in Business Services (BS henceforth) backward-linked industries, (i.e. sectors with the highest intermediate demand for services), the higher the propensity to participate in BS GVCs directly and indirectly, in line with what Linder claimed to be the case for the composition of final domestic demand favouring trade in similar sectors.
Second, we aim to challenge the views mentioned above on the opportunity to favour GVC in BS as a development strategy and more in general the argument put forward mainly by trade theorists. We do so by claiming that in the absence of a strong domestic presence of backward linked 4 manufacturing industries to BS, it is unlikely that a (developing) country would build a GVC in these sectors from scratch, or develop the capabilities to upgrade existing low value added services and develop high value added BS to join the upstream segments of existing GVCs and serve international markets. We therefore attempt preliminary reflections on the policy implications to be drawn and suggest some caution when considering unconditional participation in GVCs in services as a new pathway for sectoral and technological upgrading in developing countries.
Before venturing in the above reflections, we also consider the competing view that GVCs present new opportunities for specialisation without the need of 'building a service value chain from scratch' (as put forward in the case of manufacturing value chains by (Baldwin 2011; Baldwin & López-Gonzalez 2014, p. 4) . This view implies that backward linkages à la Hirschman may increasingly arise across national boundaries and therefore lead to participation in BS GVCs, as a result of closeness to 'headquarter' nations and regardless of the domestic sectoral structure.
Reappraising these alternative views is important as they might have different implications in terms of industrial policy, whereby putting more emphasis on favouring participation in GVCs might undermine the role of domestic industrial policy in constructing and upgrading indigenous capabilities.
The remaining of the chapter is organised as follows: the next section briefly and selectively reviews GVCs literature within trade theory. Section 3 explicitly focuses on Business Service (BS) GVCs within the empirical literature. In Section 4 we revert to the 'Hirschman-Linder' hypothesis to make sense of the emergence of services GVCs and attempt implications of industrial policy for development. Section 5 summarises and concludes.
A brief overview of GVCs within trade theory
For the purpose of this brief overview, we focus on those contributions that attempt to integrate GVCs within mainstream trade theory and draw conclusions on the benefits of offshoring for national labour markets, mainly in developed countries.
Trade theory has for over a century dealt with comparative advantage in and trade of final products.
Fragmentation of production, let alone the international spatial disaggregation of productive activities, was not really acknowledged until the 1970s, when the concept of "commodity chain" was firstly introduced, according to the reviews in (Bair 2005; De Backer and Miroudot 2013) . The 5 term then evolved to encompass the international geographical spread and the increasing interconnectedness of countries in such a process, named as "offshoring" and "global commodity chains" (Gary Gereffi 1994) . Today, (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2006) declare the end of trade in "wine for cloth", referring to the Ricardo's seminal example, and the start of fragmentation in the production of manufactured products across countries. This implies that comparative advantage has to be accounted for in terms of portions of value added: the term Global Value Chain finally enters the debate (Gary Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005; Gery Gereffi, Fernandez-Stark, and Psilos 2011; R Kaplinsky 2013) . ! According to trade scholars, a key determinant of offshoring and the emergence of GVCs is the dramatic decrease in transportation and communication costs. This has radically changed the opportunity cost of specializing in sectors and activities that once required spatial concentration, thereby undermining the role of agglomeration economies to such an extent that scholars have forecasted the 'death of distance' and a 'flat world' (Friedman 2005; Leamer 2007 ). With transport and communication costs virtually converging to zero, the locational advantages of economic activities would become increasingly meaningless, favouring their migration to destinations where factor endowments and wage competition, at least for low-skilled or 'routinised' activities, would make the key difference (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003; Autor and Dorn 2013; Baldwin 2011 ).
Building on the task approach put forward by Autor and colleagues (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003) , trade theory has moved towards a framework of trade-in-task rather than trade-in-goods, which embodies the emergence of GVCs and focuses on their effects on domestic and international labour markets and wages (see among others, (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008; Antras, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg 2006; Costinot, Vogel, and Wang 2013; Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2014) . The appeal of a task approach to explain offshoring within trade theory lies in a certain degree of determinism. The starting point is a straightforward (assumed) association between the incentives to offshore and the degree to which tasks are 'routinized' -usually (but not exclusively) performed by low-skilled labour -vis à vis the 'non-routinized' ones -usually (but not exclusively) performed by high-skilled labour. Firms would be more prone to offshore routinized rather than non-routinized tasks, thereby limiting the importance of closeness and spatial concentration for non-routinized 6 tasks, which depend on tacit knowledge and are more costly to offshore (Autor et al. 2003; Vona & Consoli 2014 ; see also Consoli & Vona, Rentocchini 2015 , from a different perspective 1 ). From a theoretical perspective, the trade-in-task framework might well lend itself to encompass service offshore, as the notion of task rather than product is intuitively more appropriate to describe not only the sequence of intermediate inputs composing the service, but the (intangible) output itself. Often, sectors such as BS include activities that Autor and colleagues (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003) would refer to as non-routinised tasks performed by high-skills jobs. 
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It is this second unbundling that has shifted the nature of international competition towards stages of production rather than final products, followed by a spatial concentration of 'factory economies', i.e. developing countries that specialize in the low-tech phases of production chains, around industrialized/developed countries such as the US, Japan and Germany, the 'headquarter' centers.
Falling costs have mattered therefore in different ways, first for disagglomeration of production and value chains within national borders, then for the international fragmentation of production and value chains across countries. Importantly, it is argued that closeness to 'headquarters' mattered particularly as it favoured the industrialization of developing countries in the form of participation in existing GVCs (rather than "building (GVCs) from scratch") (Baldwin & López-Gonzalez 2014, p.4) . What are the benefits of participating in existing GVCs rather than building them from scratch?
According to (Baldwin and López-Gonzalez 2014) , developing countries start to function as neighbouring factory economies, specialising in the lower-skilled (manufactured) portion of the value chain while the higher-skilled segments remain within the boundaries of the headquarter country. This process of joining an existing value chain is claimed to be a unique occasion for many countries, which managed to industrialise for the first time at virtually a fraction of the time-span that developed countries took to take off. For instance, countries such as Mexico, close to the US;
China, close to Japan; Poland and Turkey, close to Germany, have all increased their participation in GVCs thanks to their closeness to headquarters. (Baldwin and López-Gonzalez 2014) show that in the 'Factory North America', the US sources intermediates from a diversity of suppliers but that neighbouring Mexico predominantly buys from the US. So the pattern of specialisation driven by GVCs is that Mexico buys intermediates from the US, assembles them into final products and then exports them to American consumers (see Figure 1) . Interestingly, the same occurs in 'Factory Europe' (see Figure 2) , with Germany leading the GVC around 'factories' such as Poland and Czech Republic.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here]
In summary, as (Baldwin 2011 across the whole world, a drive that for the first time allows greater participation of suppliers from developing countries (Lewin, Massini, and Peeters 2009) .
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
Overall, the tone of the emerging discourse is prone to depicting a rosy picture of the developmental opportunities for 'periphery' countries to join service GVCs, and the role that industrial policy can play to nurture this process (Gary Gereffi and Fernandez-stark 2010b) . However, scholarship on service GVCs is still at an embryonic stage, with much empirical evidence still limited to single industry cases. This calls for some degree of caution and certainly for further research to support this view.
For instance, in a recent contribution, (Flecker, Haidinger, and Schönauer 2013) have raised doubts about the actual benefits of service offshoring for both the headquarter and recipient countries involved, mainly in relation to the labour market conditions idiosyncratic to service value chains.
They argue that the vertical disintegration of service labour markets and the lengthening of service value chains might exacerbate those aspects of value exploitation of the knowledge ability of service employees.
Global$sectoral$structural$change$and$services:$Are$we$missing$something?$$
The economics of services as a discipline has developed in parallel with the evolving theory of value and been characterized by shifting concerns. Pre-occupation about the intangibility of services and the erosion of capital accumulation leading to the threat of de-industrialization in most advanced countries 5 has subsequently mutated into optimism over the scope for knowledge accumulation and leveraging for the rest of the economy that are intrinsic in some business services 6 (for a review, see (Gallouj and Savona 2008; Ciarli, Meliciani, and Savona 2012) .
More recently, this has fed into the rhetoric surrounding the 'New Economy' and, more specifically, the 'Knowledge Economy' (Marrano, Haskel, and Wallis 2009) . These categories are often associated with the increase in Knowledge Intensive Business Services (KIBS) share in developed economies and the widespread diffusion of ICTs, which has not only dramatically reduced input costs but also allowed standardization and codification of numerous service activities 7 . The empirical evidence on the emergence of KIBS (Ciarli, Meliciani, and Savona 2012; Meliciani and 5 A seminal contribution on the topic remains (Kaldor 1966) , followed by (Baumol 1967; Fuchs 1968) . 6 Classical contributions to the opposite stand -i.e. the optimism toward the progress and 'third industrial revolution' are (Fourastié 1949; Bell 2008) . 7 The empirical assessment of the impact that technical change related to ICTs has had on services, in terms of reduced idleness of production, productivity and time-saving gains for customers is still in its infancy (Savona and Steinmueller 2013 ).
Savona 2014) has often coupled with this rethoric. 8 We observe that this view is somehow affecting the evolution of the theoretical and empirical debate within trade theory and GVC scholarship, particularly in regard to 'desirable' diversification and upgrading opportunities in a number of developing countries, which, it has been suggested, would be eased by joining business service GVCs (Ventura-Dias 2012; Crespi, Tacsir, and Vargas 2014).
We have put forward above that the increasing presence of services in the processes of international fragmentation of production is considered as a sort of 'third unbundling' of globalization, with potential beneficial effects. What are the conceptual and empirical bases supporting this view?
In what follows we put forward a few questions that we believe should nurture a research agenda on service GVCs, which ideally would bridge trade theory, GVCs scholarship and the economics of services.
1. Taking stock of the scholarship on the economics of services, should we actually consider the increasing involvement of services in GVCs as a sort of 'third unbundling' of globalisation, equivalent in importance to the processes of tertiarisation that have followed industrialisation in developed countries, only occurring now on a global scale?
2. Are the determinants of the first generation of unbundling -i.e. cost and factors endowment -also crucial in explaining service GVCs and their particular geographical spread across 'headquarter' and 'factory' economies?
3. What are the prospects for development that participation in services GVCs would ensue, compared, for instance, to those emerged for manufacturing GVCs?
4. What are the implications in terms of (national) industrial policy? Do we need a different approach that takes into account the questions (and answers) above?
We do not attempt answers to all questions here. We wish instead to briefly discuss the first two by advancing interpretation of the phenomenon of service GVCs that complements the one sketched above. However, we believe, and discuss more in the conclusions, that further research is needed to disentangle crucial issues such as the quality of development that participation in services GVCs might ensue, and, most importantly, the implications for alternative approaches to industrial policy that this phenomenon calls for.
When Linder meets Hirschman: a complementary view of services GVCs
As mentioned above, it has been argued that the increasing standardization and transferability of knowledge following the spread of ICTs have been the most important drivers behind increased outsourcing and offshoring that have concerned (some) business services. Most likely the business services that have most gained from increased standardization are also those that are the most routinized to start with (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003) , and that appear at the low end of the map provided by (Gary Gereffi and Fernandez-stark 2010a) and reported in Figure 3 .
Although focused on a smaller and higher-end set of BS (R&D, ICT-related services, engineering, technical consultancy and legal services) and on a developed context, the European evidence produced in shows that BS tend to spatially agglomerate and localize close to the industries that are highly intensive in BS, typically high tech manufacturing industries. Interestingly, in a very recent paper, (Bahar, Hausmann, and Hidalgo 2014) (Blinder 2006) .
In reappraising the theory discussed in Section 2, and particularly the main assumptions behind it, as to whether they apply to service offshoring, we claim therefore that the stickiness of knowledgeand spatial distribution of skills to perform those tasks that are typically non-routinized within Autor's and Balwin's world -are likely to counterbalance the effects of falling transport and communication costs, as shown at the regional level by and at the national level by (Bahar, Hausmann, and Hidalgo 2014) .
Further core assumptions of both trade theory and GVC scholarship seem to be ill-suited to account for the observed rise in service offshoring. One of these is the disagglomeration between production and consumption (Blinder 2006) . For most service activities, it is difficult to conceptually and empirically separate their provision and consumption, in line with what scholars in the economics of services call co-terminality. As a consequence, much of the effects of falling costs that have indeed favoured the disagglomeration of production of manufactured goods might simply not affect services.
Which services are most likely to be offshored?
Either the low segments of the value chains, as largely shown by (Gary Gereffi and Fernandez-stark 2010a), due to the separability of standardised and codified knowledge between the supplier and the 15 recipient, or those highly intensive in non-standardised and tacit knowledge that seem to have however mostly concerned 'headquarter' countries so far (Kowalski et al. 2015) . The increasing involvement of services in GVCs is therefore the result of more complex processes, that, in our view, are unlikely to be exclusively attributed to the same historical processes of falling costs that characterised the first two globalisation unbundling. The considerations above beg for a complementary framework to explain GVCs in services.
When$Linder$meets$Hirschman$$
The basic intuition that we attempt to articulate below is that in the absence of a strong domestic presence of backward-linked industries to (high-end) services as most BS, it appears unlikely that a (developing) country would construct its own or join an existing BS GVC, or indeed both, let alone upgrade from existing lower-value added services GVCs and develop competitive BS. To articulate our intuition, we revive two seminal classical contributions to the theory of international trade and economic development, respectively those of Staffan Burenstam Linder and Albert Hirschman.
While we have no pretense to formalize anything here, we hope that this might stimulate further reflection and research.
Interestingly, both Hirschman (Hirschman 1958) and Linder (Burenstam Linder 1961) represent alternative voices to the mainstream trade and development thinking at their time (Lundahl 2005) .
In a seminal text on economic development, Hirschman (1958) Recently, the role of structural change is being increasingly brought back in the development debate (Lin 2012; Stiglitz, Lin, and Monga 2013) , which is extremely interesting from our perspective.
The work of Linder (Burenstam Linder 1961 ) also emerged as a particularly radical stand against mainstream trade theory following the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model. The latter explained foreign trade on the basis of cross-country differences in factor endowments, such that capitalendowed countries would export capital-intensive goods and reach higher incomes per capita, while countries relatively more labour-endowed would specialise in and trade labour-intensive goods.
Linder put forward what it is now known as the Linder Thesis, his main contribution to the theory of foreign trade.
According to Linder (1961) , the Heckscher-Ohlin model was able to explain trade in raw materials, but less so trade in manufactured goods. The latter trade depended on whether a country reached a certain level of domestic representative demand in a particular manufactured good. This benchmark level of domestic demand, in turn, provided the necessary information from purchasers to producers, which eventually allow them to face competition in foreign market. Therefore countries with a similar structure of final demand -owing for instance to similar levels of per capita incometended to have similar structures of trade specialisation.
A joint Hirschman-Linder hypothesis reprises the importance of Hirschman linkages and (a modified version of) the Linder Thesis, refers to domestic intermediate rather than final demand and considers them jointly in explaining the propensity to join services offshoring GVCs.
As argued above, our belief is that traditional determinants of cost and factor endowments are able to explain less of the recent processes of 'global structural change' involving services offshoring. (Koopman et al. 2010; Erumban et al. 2011 ).
The findings in López-Gonzalez et al. (2014) show that a joint Hirschman-Linder hypothesis holds for the (WIOD) sample of countries and, indeed, for the emerging countries only. Also, the intermediate demand coming from close trade partners emerges as having a displacement effect on the likelihood to participate in service GVCs by developing countries. This seems to be at odds with the idea that countries can enter global value chains by mainly relying on global demand and regardless of their own specialization. There are of course counter-evidences to these findings, although based on specific cases. For instance, both (Lema, Quadros, and Schmitz 2012) and (Gary Gereffi and Fernandez-stark 2010a) look at the Indian offshore service industries and show thatdespite the absence of a strong backward-linked industry, it has massively upgraded, from an initial specialization in mature segments of it (IT and BPO) to higher value added segments such as KPO and R&D. It would be interesting to find more evidence that corroborates long-term upgrading processes exclusively led by foreign demand.
Concluding remarks
This chapter has proposed a brief and selected reappraisal of the theoretical and empirical literature on GVCs with a particular focus on service GVCs, which have recently emerged as the latest path of international fragmentation of production. Our aim was two-fold.
First, we reviewed the new developments of trade theory based on the trade-in-task framework, and critically assessed whether they have explained, let alone looked at, service offshoring. Based on the literature on the economics of services and on empirical evidence on the spatial concentration of these activities, albeit in developed countries, we proposed a complementary view on the emergence of service GVCs.
Second, we pointed out the need for further research on the opportunity to favour participation in service GVCs as a developmental strategy, which the GVC scholarship seems to be increasingly suggesting.
We briefly reviewed the trade-in-task framework and emphasised that its core assumption relates to falling transport and communication costs, which are claimed to have caused two different 'unbundling' of the globalisation process (Baldwin 2011; Baldwin 2012; Baldwin and López-Gonzalez 2014) . We acknowledged that the adoption of the task approach put forward by (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003) and (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2014) might in principle well serve the purpose of a generalised framework that encompasses international fragmentation of production of intangible activities such as services. We have not attempted this here, though have suggested that research in trade theory might fruitfully pursue this direction of investigation.
Rather, we have reviewed the empirical evidence on GVCs in services, so far mainly based on industry cases (among others, Gereffi & Fernandez-stark 2010a; Lema et al. 2012 ) and asked whether the first-time participation of developing countries in service offshoring might be considered as a 'third unbundling' of globalisation, paraphrasing Baldwin (2011) . Indeed, developing countries, especially those in Latin America after East Asia, are increasingly becoming a destination for service offshoring. Despite underlying optimism on the benefits of such trends, the trade-in-task framework suggests in our view that falling transport and communication costs would mainly favour the fragmentation and offshoring of 'routinized' tasks, usually involving lowerskilled jobs. Some developing countries might therefore become favourite destinations of those segments of service offshoring that mainly compete on price rather than skills and talent. Only in a few cases, countries such as India and (a few) Latin American ones, have managed to join higher value added segments of service GVCs (Lema, Quadros, and Schmitz 2012; , N.
Mulder, K. Fernandez-Stark, P. Sauvé, D. López Giral 2014).
We argued that -due to the specificity and heterogeneity of the industry at play, especially within What would the equivalent of the infant industry policy be in a globalised world? Would the rationale behind the infant industry policy be holding in an internationally fragmented production system? Would it have the same potential for production, technology and export upgrading that was implicit in its original argument?
Surely industrial policy for development must take into account the increasing international fragmentation of production. One of the challenges of industrial policy in this context is to avoid that a country runs the risk of freezing its specialisation pattern at the lower end of value chains, with little scope for subsequent technological upgrading and structural change, before venturing 20 into international value chains. It is a matter of directing domestic structural change in terms of both quality and timing.
This is the reason why we believe that it important to reappraise different views on service GVCs as an opportunity for catching up in developing countries, as they have different implications in terms of industrial policy, whereby favouring participation in those GVCs that have little scope for upgrading or joining them ahead of the time needed to build domestic capabilities, might be detrimental.
To conclude, we hope to have stimulated interest in pursuing both trade theoretic and empirical GVC research in a direction that is able to address the following question: To what extent is joining service GVCs a sustainable policy when it is decoupled from local/domestic accumulation of capabilities in highly developmental Hirschman-linked sectors?
